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As Kim Dae-Jung’s single term as President of the Republic of Korea (henceforth Korea) 
ended in February 2002, his level of public approval was far from its peak. His successor, 
Roh Moo-Hyun owed his victory, in part, to his ability to differentiate his leadership style 
from what he called the “emperor-like leadership and factional and regional strife” of Korean 
presidents, including Kim, the founder of his party, the Millenium Democratic Party (MDP).1 
Kim, too, had earlier identified the problem of the so-called imperial presidency as an 
obstacle to the consolidation of Korea’s democracy. Indeed, Kim came to power in 1998 with 
a full program of reform for Korea’s political institutions, economy and foreign relations. The 
purpose of this paper is twofold: to examine Kim’s record as a democratic reformer, 
measuring his stated goals against the achievements of his presidency, and to use Kim’s 
presidency as an example of the opportunities and pitfalls surrounding political leadership and 
the consolidation of democracy.    
 
There is, of course, a logical inconsistency in the expectation that a single individual can play 
a central role in democratisation – by definition the dispersal of political power. Debate about 
the role of leadership (as well as the role of elites more generally) in the consolidation of 
democracy remains polarised. The strongest argument in favour of the transformative 
potential of leaders has been put by Huntington, who argued that "if he had wanted to, a 
political leader far less skilled than Lee Kuan Yew could have produced democracy in 
Singapore.”2 However, such a leader would have produced the only democracy in East Asia 
outside of Japan; quite an achievement for an individual. There are two dimensions to such an 
assertion. The first is that leaders make choices about the kind of regime they would prefer. 
The second is that leaders are in a position to "produce" such a regime. Most scholars of 
democratisation have rejected the degree of elite autonomy implicit in Huntington’s 
                                                          
1 The Australian. November 29, 2002, p9. 
2 Samuel Huntington, 1991. The Third Wave. New Haven: Yale University Press, p108. 
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formulation. It is important to instead see leadership as a relationship between leaders and 
broader societal forces, not something that individuals do to their societies. Recent decades 
have seen studies of democratisation that have attempted to shed light on this “structured 
contingency,” in which political actors are constrained by such variables as economic 
conditions, political culture, foreign influences, and social institutions.  
 
What better subject, then, to explore the importance of political leadership to the course of 
democratic consolidation, than “Korea’s Nelson Mandela,” Kim Dae Jung. The first part of 
the article discusses the concept of democratic consolidation, and the place of leadership 
within that process. After providing background on the progress of democratisation up to the 
Kim’s election as President in 1997, Kim’s achievements during his term will be measured 
both against his own goals, and against the benchmarks of consolidation discussed below. 
Kim’s reform program is divided into three areas – the economic structure, political 
institutions, and relations with North Korea – to show the way in which all of Kim’s policies 
were linked by his single vision of democratisation. Kim’s record reveals the difficulties of a 
single leader seeking to pursue the goal of democratisation. While he made important 
democratic inroads into Korea’s economic and political institutions, he soon came to remind 
many Koreans of the nation’s major shortcoming as a democracy, its’ hierarchical, 
personality-based political culture.  
 
What is Democratic Consolidation? 
The distinction between the stages of transition to and consolidation of democracy is one 
worth making, since consolidation usually involves different actors, motivations and methods 
than transition. Just as there is little agreement on the definition of democracy, so too 
consensus on the definition of democratic consolidation eludes scholars.  Consolidation 
generally refers to the period between the transition and the point at which a reversion to 
Wayne Errington: Kim-Dae Jung and the Consolidation of Democracy in South Korea 
Page 4 
authoritarianism is unthinkable without some sort of exogenous shock. In a consolidated 
democracy, actors have a commitment to democratic processes, not simply a calculated 
acquiescence to democracy. However, to the extent that democracy is a set of processes 
(regular free and fair elections), it is difficult to demarcate a consolidated democracy from an 
unconsolidated one. It is the evolution of attitudes among political actors, as well as the 
public, that consolidates the institutions established during the transition phase. However, the 
difficulty in measuring such attitudes explains the popularity of simpler measures of 
consolidation. The two-turnover test, as the name suggests, holds that two changes of the 
party or coalition forming the executive is an indicator of a consolidated democracy. Such 
changes of power indicate the conduct of free and fair elections. However, quantitative 
measures are always likely to miss some serious qualitative flaws in a democratic system, as 
they seemed to in Korea’s case.  
 
Indeed, a shift in political culture toward the routinisation of democratic habits and values 
would indicate that a transition to democracy is unlikely to be reversed easily. This gradual 
institutionalisation of liberal and democratic values reduces the public (and elite) acceptability 
of military intervention or states of emergency. This reasoning about political culture 
dovetails with recent findings on the nexus between economic development and democracy. 
While transitions to democracy can occur at any level of economic development, transitions 
away from democracy, whilst common at lower levels of economic development, never occur 
in wealthy countries (those with an annual GDP per capita of US$10 000). Both the political 
culture and the economic development accounts of democratic consolidation suggest that 
consolidation is differs from transition in that transition to democracy can be distilled to a set 
of processes (hence the proliferation of actor-centred accounts of late). Consolidation, on the 
other hand, while it may be measured in quantitative terms, is ultimately a matter of political 
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institutionalisation; of changes in the economy, social mores, and political attitudes that give 
support to democratic to democratic processes.  
 
To envisage an important role for leadership in the consolidation of democracy, though, is to 
resolve the contradiction between the ambitions of a strong national leader and the fragile 
institutions of a new democracy. While poorly theorised, the place of leadership in the process 
of democratisation has received much attention given the surge of agent-centred accounts of 
transition to democracy in recent decades. “Visionary and accommodating leadership” is said 
to assist democratic consolidation.3 According to Linz, for successful consolidation of 
democracy, "leaders must convince people of the value of newly gained freedoms … and at 
the same time they must convey to them the impossibility of overcoming in the short-run the 
dismal legacy" of the previous regime.4 The legitimacy of democracy in the eyes of the public 
is highly dependent on the behaviour of leaders in the early period of consolidation. Even the 
most well-intentioned of leaders though, must consolidate their own power in order to be 
effective. Self-effacing leadership of the kind described here is not typical of that found in 
democratic systems.  
 
Democracy in Korea to 1997 
As President, Kim was attempting to consolidate democracy in a state that had conducted free 
and fair elections since 1987. Korean presidents are elected for a single five-year term. It is 
generally agreed that Kim Dae Jung's election as President of South Korea was itself an 
important contribution to democratic consolidation. However, Korea’s "shallow and 
                                                          
3 Larry Diamond and Doh Chull-Shin, 2000. “Introduction: Institutional Reform and Democratic Consolidation 
in Korea.” in Institutional Reform and Democratic Consolidation in Korea, edited by Larry Diamond and Doh 
Chull Shin. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, p20. 
4 Linz cited in Doh Chull-Shin 1994, “On the Third Wave of Democratisation: A Synthesis and Evaluation of 
Recent Theory and Research,” World Politics. No 47, p. 139-40. 
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immature" democratic institutions had been commonly criticised since the transition in 1987.5 
The lack of accountability and transparency, and lack of policy choices between parties, a 
hegemonic governing party supported by big business, and marginalization of opposition 
through constitutional means (such as restrictions on trade unions) were the major problems. 
Despite some success in legitimation through economic success, the Korean state failed to 
develop a governing consensus, instead relying on a combination of charismatic authority and 
repression. Park's successors were unable to reproduce his regime, leading to the compromise 
with opposition forces in 1987.  
 
Leadership is a recurring theme when the consolidation of democracy in Korea is discussed. 
However, leadership is usually seen as a problem - how to overcome the personalisation of 
power. Notwithstanding a paternalistic political culture, Koreans generally have a low opinion 
of their political leaders.6 Many of the strategies used by authoritarian-era presidents to 
control the legislature are still practised. The party leader holds the key to party nominations, 
so members are forced to toe the leader's line to keep their seats.  
 
Within Korea, two views on the nature of democracy dominate politics. The first, radical view 
understands democracy as justice, calling for greater attention to human rights and economic 
equality. The second discourse subordinates democracy to the primacy of security and 
national sovereignty. Adherents to this conservative view tar adherents to the radical view 
with sympathy for North Korea. No concession was made to social-democratic notions of 
democracy as social justice. Such talk was simply lumped in with communism. Security 
concerns explain, at least in part, why Koreans share with the Taiwanese a lower commitment 
                                                          
5 Diamond, Larry, and Byung-Kook Kim. 2000. “Introduction: Consolidating Democracy in South Korea.” in 
Consolidating Democracy in South Korea, edited by Larry Diamond and Byung-Kook Kim. Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, p 2. 
6 Hahn Ki-shik, 2001. “Political Leadership in Korean Politics.” in Understanding Korean Politics: An 
Introduction, edited by Soong Hoom Kil and Chung-in Moon. Albany: State University of New York Press, 
p.135. 
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to democracy than citizens in other newly democratised states.7 Democracy is, according to 
this discourse, understood as free elections for national office. However, in order to protect 
Korea from communism, this discourse justified the suppression of civil society under 
successive presidents. One might argue that Korean leaders have used an ongoing crisis of 
national security to justify their authoritarian measures. There is, of course, within this 
discourse, much disagreement about the lengths a regime might go to protect the sovereignty 
of its citizens. The transition to democracy in 1987 was thus accepted as the opportunity to 
freely elect a President. This change did not, however, imply the need for other political 
reforms that might undermine national security. Korea’s democracy would thus struggle to 
extend itself beyond the “procedural minima” of the 1987 transition.8  
 
A common criticism of post-1987 Korean democracy has been that state-society relations had 
remained more or less the same despite the conduct of free elections.9 This was in part due to 
the nature of the transition, where the ruling party had accommodated opposition demands 
and incumbent (former general) Roh Tae Woo had won the 1987 presidential election. To the 
extent that state-business relations could have been characterised during the 1960s and 70s as 
business dependence on the state, the relationship was much more evenly balanced by the 
1980s. Democratisation had reduced the “integrating power” of the presidency, which Park 
had used to promote government in the national interest with a series of five-year economic 
plans.10 Thus, in the period after democratisation, before civic groups had a chance to 
organise, the most politically adept actors remained the chaebol. An example of the malign 
corporate influence was Samsung’s securing of government permission to make automobiles, 
                                                          
7 see Chu Yun-han, Larry Diamond, and Doh Chull-Shin, 2001. “Halting Progress in Korea and Taiwan.” 
Journal of Democracy 12:122-136. 
8 Doh Chull-Shin. 1999. Mass Politics and Culture in Democratizing Korea. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, p.20. 
9 Doh 1999, Bruce Cumings, 2000. “Democracy and Civil Society in South Korea.” in Pathways to Democracy: 
The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions, edited by James F. Hollifield and Calvin Jillson. New York: 
Routledge. 
10 John Kie-Chiang Oh, 1999. Korean Politics: The Quest for Democratization and Development. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, p. 55. 
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against the wishes of bureaucrats and against the logic of Korea’s already high car 
manufacturing capacity. This type of pressure on the leader, though, doesn’t just come from 
the elite. The public was mobilised in the “Save Kia” movement in 1997, as that corporation 
fought to stave off bankruptcy.  
 
In order to ascend to the presidency after three decades in politics, Kim Young Sam, along 
with a group of followers in the National Assembly, joined the ruling party in a coalition. He 
was elected President in 1992. A series of scandals highlighted the large amounts of money 
the ruling party raised in order to retain power. Consistent with his record as an opposition 
figure, Kim sought to boost his own popularity by exposing the corruption of the past. Two 
former leaders, Chun and Roh, were sentenced to death in 1996 on charges of corruption and 
murder. Kim also reshuffled the military hierarchy, favouring officers friendly to civilian rule. 
The most far-reaching of his reforms was greater transparency in politics and business, 
through disclosure of politicians’ wealth and the “real name” system for financial 
transactions. These early changes were both far-reaching and successful. However, he had 
failed to mobilise his own party behind the reform movement, relying instead on his personal 
authority. For example, the real name system was issued by emergency decree, the popularity 
of the measure giving the National Assembly little choice but to acquiesce to the President’s 
policy.11  
 
In December 1996, Kim ordered the expedition of two contentious pieces of legislation 
through the National Assembly. The first restored powers for the Agency for National 
Security Planning to spy on Korean citizens, the second reduced job security. After much 
protest, the laws were repealed, but Kim’s credentials as a reformer were tarnished. The 
coalition of reformists and conservatives that had brought him to power in 1992 was 
inherently unstable. Efforts to change arrangements for elections and political parties were far 
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less successful. When Kim himself, his staff, as well as his son, were implicated in a new 
scandal over the collapse of Hanbo Steel in 1997, his reform drive was undermined.  His 
political reforms, and the trials of the former presidents, were for Kim a “moral crusade”.12 
Kim was also frustrated in his reforms by institutional constraints. The ruling party changed 
its name twice under Kim, contesting the 1997 elections as the Grand National Party. A 
regional governor, Rhee In Jae crippled the government’s chances by splitting from the GNP 
and taking 19% of the presidential vote. Kim Young Sam left office having disappointed the 
democracy movement. There was, therefore, a centrist group of MPs and voters not yet 
wedded to the conservative bloc, despite the party merger of 1992. Most Koreans believed 
that Kim’s presidency represented an improvement in the quality of democracy than under 
Roh but that it fell short of a high level of democracy.13 
 
Kim Dae Jung’s forced exile from Korea’s political institutions under Park and Chun made 
him less a creature of those institutions than other leaders, although he was naturally 
constrained by the legal and cultural environment. His inner circle of support was not 
historically directed towards dealing with Korea’s chief political institutions. Kim’s major 
political ties as a dissident were with the union movement. Trade unions had been tamed by 
patronage under Rhee and suppressed under Park. Park’s regime kept wages as low as 
possible to gain competitiveness. Unions were painted as sources of communist agitation. 
Even after the 1987 transition, their activities were heavily curtailed by law.  
 
No Korean political party could be described as left-wing. Even Kim Dae-Jung’s party has 
never vigorously promoted working-class interests in the democratic. This raises the question 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
11 Doh 1999, p. 7 
12 Kim Byung-Kook. 1998. “Korea's Crisis of Success.” in Democracy in East Asia, edited by Larry Diamond 
and Mark Plattner. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, p.115. 
13 Lee Sook-Jong, 2000. “Mass Perceptions of Democracy.” in Institutional Reform and Democratic 
Consolidation in Korea, edited by Larry Diamond and Doh Chull Shin. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, p. 
260. 
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of the effectiveness of representation in Korea’s democracy.  In the 1970s, Kim’s economic 
prescription was industrial democracy. While quite different from his economically liberal 
stance as President, there is a common thread to these positions. Kim has been a consistent 
opponent of the power of the chaebol. Part of the reason for this is Kim’s image of himself as 
a crusader for democracy against entrenched undemocratic forces. In a characteristically 
Korean way, the pro-democracy leader was an autocrat in the way he managed his movement. 
Kim Young Sam was of similar character, evidenced by the two leader’s failure to agree on a 
pro-democracy candidate for the 1987 elections and by Kim Young Sam’s record in dealing 
with the National Assembly.  
 
Army generals had warned during the 1992 campaign that they would sooner stage a coup 
than accept Kim as President. By the time he was elected, though, changes in army personnel, 
as well as in public attitudes to the military in the wake of the trials of Chun and Roh, 
eliminated the danger of a coup. However, Kim still needed to deal with the perception 
among conservative Koreans that he would compromise the nation’s security. Agreeing to the 
coalition with Kim Jong Pil would placate many conservative voters, but would also ensure 
that any legislative majority would have to include this nationalistic bloc. Kim Jong Pil broke 
with the ruling coalition in 1995. A former KCIA chief, Kim would deliver crucial 
conservative votes to Kim Dae Jung at the election and in the parliament. Kim Jong Pil 
convinced Kim Dae Jung to take on a policy of moving Korea from a presidential to a 
parliamentary system. Kim Jong Pil’s argument was that parliamentarism would reduce 
regionalism, although he also had his eye on the office of prime minister. DJ had previously 
supported the presidential system. This type of deal making was characteristic of the way that 
institutional reform had been carried out in Korea. Even after the change of government, there 
was no sense of stepping back to design a constitution suitable for Korea, in the way Thais 
would in 1997.  
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Civil society was considerably stronger by the time Kim came to power than it was at the time 
of the transition. Many NGOs sprang up after the 1987 transition. People’s Solidarity for 
Participatory Democracy (PSPD), for example, had for some time been fighting for the 
interests of small shareholders against the chaebol. Also linking economic and political issues 
was the Citizen’s Coalition For Economic Justice. More specifically concerned with 
redistribution of income and environmental issues, this group would be less amenable to 
liberal economic reforms. Such groups, while each boasting only a handful of members, and 
maintained a strong media profile due to their non-partisan status.14 This circle of support 
helped Kim in providing an atmosphere conducive to democratisation but these NGOs would 
not hesitate to criticise him once he became president if they felt he deserved it. 
 
 
In the 1990s, Kim had taken up the interests of small and medium sized business, which 
found it difficult to get credit in a system biased toward the chaebol. He surrounded himself 
with economic advisers, many trained in the United States, hostile to the power of the 
chaebol, and in 1996 published a book arguing for economic restructuring. Kim had therefore 
carved for himself a considerable arena of support, made up of disparate groups hostile to the 
ruling bloc. The crisis would provide the opportunity to give common purpose to these circles 
of support, and extend his wider circle of support to the conservative middle class. In 
particular, Kim would need to build greater support at the elite level (in particular the 
legislature and bureaucracy) to govern effectively. For Kim, then, his leadership efforts would 
involve using his wider circle of support to pressure Korea’s political institutions into reform, 
aimed at consolidating both Korean democracy and his own position as President. As noted in 
the introduction, though, those twin goals are potentially in conflict.  
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The 1997 presidential election campaign coincided with the dramatic fall in the value of the 
Korean currency, the won. However, the new President lacked a majority in the National 
Assembly. He therefore had an incentive to appeal to the people over the heads of the 
parliament. This chapter sets out the way in which Kim sought to further the cause of 
democracy in Korea. Kim’s approach to the presidency is thus described as an example of 
crisis leadership. His major goals for the consolidation of democracy are divided into 
economic reform, institutional reform, and reconciliation with North Korea. Some assessment 
is then made of the impact of his leadership and the veracity of Kim’s claims to be furthering 
democratisation. This is achieved by comparing the ability of the crisis leadership model and 
other approaches to democratisation to account for post-crisis politics in Korea.  
 
Koreans would be wary of a president invoking the specter of crisis as a means of retaining 
popular support. This tactic had been a mainstay tactic of the military regime during the 1970s 
and 1980s, in order to circumvent opposition. Then, the crises were mostly the threat from the 
North, but also impending economic doom, unless stringent measures were taken. This crisis 
mentality was primarily designed to restrict political mobilisation of the labour movement, 
isolating militant unionists from the rest of society. Therefore, winning over the unions in the 
crisis environment would be a potential problem for Kim. By the 1980s, over-use of this 
appeal to patriotism had blunted its effectiveness. However, business and government 
continued to use nationalist sentiment well into the 1990s, citing such problems as the 
growing trade deficit. While no-one could argue against the view that the 1997 economic 
crisis required decisive policy moves on the part of the President, use of this power for 
partisan ends would be met with great suspicion. 
 
Economic Reform 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
14 Oh 1999, 162 
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Kim’s economic program was the most urgent part of his reform agenda and one that he 
continually infused with political meaning. Before and after he gained the presidency, Kim 
continually drew links between economic reform and democratisation. There were three 
elements to Kim’s leadership strategy in tackling the economic crisis. The first was to use his 
mandate as newly-elected president to push as much legislation as possible through the 
opposition-dominated National Assembly. The second strategy was summitry – direct 
negotiation with chaebol chairmen, and the tripartite commission incorporating labor unions. 
Finally, Kim would use the “bully pulpit” of the presidency to publicly reprimand recalcitrant 
participants. The Federation of Korean Industry was the recipient of many such attacks.15 
These strategies allowed him to force economic restructuring that the previous President, Kim 
Young Sam, had sought but failed to achieve.16 
 
The regional crisis had been foreshadowed in Korea by the collapse of the Hanbo steel group 
early in 1997. The company appears to have benefited from preferential bank loans (which 
allowed it to cover up its deteriorating financial position) in return for large donations to the 
governing political party. This kind of influence had blunted the reform program of President 
Kim Young Sam. Korea’s impressive record of nine per cent annual growth for over thirty 
years made the financial crisis of late 1997 all the more shocking to the public. The crisis 
came just as Koreans had been celebrating joining the "rich countries club" (the OECD) and 
surpassing US $10,000 per capita GDP. Achieving this goal also gave the government further 
incentive to maintain an over-valued exchange rate. With an election approaching, Kim 
Young Sam was in no mood to talk of an impending crisis. It appears, though, that the 
governing party only lost the December election because of a failure to agree on a single 
candidate17, rather than being held publicly accountable for the economic crisis.  
 
                                                          
 15 Asiaweek. February 26, 1999.  
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As a new president, untainted by the crisis, Kim used his inauguration speech to draw a line 
between past practice and future needs.  
 
[The financial crisis] would not have taken place unless the political, 
economic and financial leaders of this country were tainted by a 
collusive link between politics and business and by government-
directed banking practices …democracy and the market are two sides 
of a coin. 
 
Far from being “the IMF’s man in Seoul,”18 Kim quickly realised the leverage the IMF 
program gave him over the business and bureaucratic interests he knew would attempt to 
undermine his presidency. According to Kim’s view, democracy supports the development of 
the market by preventing activities like corruption and collusive ties between government and 
business. Taking the extra step of connecting market and democratic freedoms would assist 
him in his long-term goal of democratisation. This realisation lies behind his change of 
rhetoric before and after the election. As a candidate, Kim had been skeptical of the IMF’s 
policies. However, he quickly came to see the IMF program as an opportunity to clip the 
political wings of the chaebol. Long before the crisis, it was Kim’s policy to encourage 
smaller enterprises previously starved of credit in order to provide greater competition for the 
larger conglomerates.19 
 
The first IMF program was signed before Kim’s inauguration. Most Koreans were annoyed 
that the IMF instructed the chaebol to change their ways. They may have resented the power 
of the chaebol but they were also fired with nationalism. There was thus considerable room 
for opposition to Kim’s policies utilising the opposite economic (if not political) message. 
The opposition Grand National Party sought to blame the crisis on key economic officials, 
absolving the new party leadership. Blaming individuals also divorced the political and 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
18 Bruce Cumings, 1998. “The Korean Crisis and the End of 'Late' Development.” New Left Review :43-72, p. 62. 
19 Oh 1999, p. 237 
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economic system the ruling party had created from responsibility. This rhetoric was combined 
with various theories of how the rest of the world was conspiring to undermine Korea’s 
economic system. Much of this nationalist analysis of the crisis was shared by the labour 
unions. An opportunity therefore existed for common cause between the GNP, chaebol and 
the unions. Nationalism would also provide an effective rallying cry with which to win public 
support. It was far from inevitable, then, that Kim’s view of the political economy of the crisis 
would prevail.  
 
Close ties between government and business had been a mainstay of Korea’s economic 
progress over three decades. While breaking that nexus would aid Kim politically, it raised 
two challenges. First, he had to consider whether he could gain public support for divergence 
from a long-held corporatist strategy. Second, he knew that the chaebol would continue to 
play a crucial role in any economic recovery. He could not afford to alienate them to any great 
degree. Kim’s narrow victory, as well as the habits of lengthy periods in power, gave some 
conservative forces the confidence to resist his reform program. The chaebol still had many 
supporters in the National Assembly, where the opposition Grand National Party (GNP) 
resisted all but emergency reform measures. In fact, Kim’s hold on power was extremely 
shaky. He defeated the GNP candidate by just 1.5%, despite a split in the ruling party. He had 
few friends within the bureaucracy. The President’s new budget and planning bureau was thus 
designed to by-pass the Ministry of Finance and Economics.  
 
While a sense of national emergency existed, the National Assembly quickly passed laws on 
bankruptcy and corporate transparency. Even before he was sworn in, Kim persuaded the 
chairmen of the four largest chaebol to eliminate cross-investments, reduce debt to equity 
ratios,20 and to specialise in their own industry sectors. This would in part be achieved by a 
                                                          
20 The debt to equity ratios of the top 30 chaebol averaged 519% in late 1997. The agreement was to reduce this 
level to 200% by the end of 1999.  
Wayne Errington: Kim-Dae Jung and the Consolidation of Democracy in South Korea 
Page 16 
series of “Big Deals” whereby non-performing subsidiaries would be disposed of. In practice, 
this would be a controversial process. The more contentious and far-reaching reforms were to 
be tackled by a tri-partite committee of business, unions and the government. The types of 
issues dealt with in this way included more flexible labour laws, reducing the size of the 
chaebol, and restrictions on corporate cross-holding and lending practices. Kim’s strategy 
involved putting public pressure on business and labour representatives to compromise in 
what Kim presented as the national interest. The government could then present the 
legislature with laws based on this consensus. The chaebol were financially weak, giving the 
government much leverage over them. The President used his personal ties with the union 
movement to gain concessions on acquiescing to layoffs. In-principle commitment to reform 
at the height of the crisis, then, came relatively easily. However, these deals also lacked 
transparency. Kim had set a pattern of using questionable tactics to achieve an important goal.  
 
Problems arose during the implementation stage, when job losses became real, rather than 
forecasts. Kim’s strategy to contain public concern about economic restructuring was to 
utilise the unpopularity of the chaebol. He also emphasised his personal distance from 
business and the high personal regard in which the public held him. Thus, a pattern emerged 
of Kim using his personal authority to bring about change. At the height of the crisis, this may 
have been expedient. However, the opposition would later remember the President’s high-
handedness when they had a majority in the Assembly.  
 
The liberal view of Korea’s political economy into which Kim had bought suggested that 
Korea failed to live up to world’s best practice in a host of areas. Improvements in accounting 
standards, management practice, bank lending, and the rights of shareholders would improve 
both the efficiency of the economy and reduce the collusion between politicians and business. 
It was Kim’s liberal interpretation of the crisis that was supported by most economists and in 
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the media. The public was supportive of these broad principles, even after much of the pain of 
restructuring took place.21 Success for the governing party in local elections in 1998 provided 
a further fillip to the President. However, Kim’s early legislative victories would prove to be 
the high watermark of his presidency. A number of factors combined to reduce his ability to 
appeal directly to the public to hasten reform. A series of minor corruption scandals within the 
government during 1999 undermined the moral authority of the President. Kim’s personal 
standing was always high even among those who would never vote for him due to his 
perceived radicalism. His ability to point the finger at the corruption of others was affected 
not by any personal impropriety but by the administration’s tardiness in dealing with these 
scandals.  
 
Probably more important than all of these factors in undermining Kim’s leadership capacity 
was the receding sense of national urgency. A quick bounce-back to economic growth would 
reduce both the political urgency to reform the chaebol and remove the economic (if not the 
political) rationale for doing so. Restoration of Korea’s international liquidity early in 1998 
led to a rapid economic recovery throughout 1999, so much so that the central bank found 
itself intervening to keep the currency low enough to retain export competitiveness. Kim was 
left with a smaller national audience concerned with abstract issues of “reform” and “national 
renewal”. While many elite figures such as journalists and academics took an interest in these 
big picture issues, the rest of society turned its attention to the issues that affected them 
directly. National Assembly elections in early 2000 saw the coalition lose its legislative 
majority, but the losses were suffered by the ULD, not by Kim’s Millenium Democratic 
Party.  
 
Kim Dae Jung’s progress in restructuring the economy should be compared to those of his 
predecessor. Kim Young Sam attempted to reduce the concentration of power of the largest 
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chaebol but his reforms ran into opposition within his own party, and sometimes conflicted 
with the need to keep the Korean economy competitive. Kim Young Sam’s policies included 
greater transparency in ownership and control (the “real name” financial system), and more 
opportunities for small, medium and foreign companies to compete with the chaebol. These 
reforms failed, however, to prevent the expansion of the chaebol throughout the 1990s. 
Further, Kim Young Sam’s association with the ruling party limited his incentive to pursue 
the wholesale restructuring of corporate power sought by his successor.  
 
To what extent, though, have Kim’s economic policies been consistent, as he claims, with 
democratisation? Jayasuriya suggests that the kinds of changes to economic policy-making 
proposed by Kim represent a kind of constitutionalism (liberalism, in other words, rather than 
democratisation) for the economy.22 Central bank independence is the most common form of 
this constitutionalism, where important decisions are removed from the political arena. In 
Korea, the setting of monetary policy was until recently kept in line with overall government 
policy on credit creation and industrial development. Much greater independence for the Bank 
of Korea to pursue monetary stability was legislated in 1998. The very idea that liberal 
economic reform represents some kind of democratisation has, of course, been challenged. 
According to Jayasuriya, these policies “could not be but illiberal” and undemocratic because 
they seek to place policy power beyond “transitory political majorities.”23 Kim, on the other 
hand believed it was democratic to limit the influence of a handful of capitalists and 
bureaucrats over economic policy. Were the corporatist arrangements in Korea of the 
democratic variety found in Northern Europe, Jayasuriya’s point would be well made. 
However, it was the malign influence of concentrated corporate power and political 
corruption that was Kim’s primary concern. His goal was to practise democracy and a market 
                                                          
22 Kanishka Jayasuriya, 2001. “Governance, Post Washington Consensus and The New Anti-Politics.” Hong 
Kong: Southeast Asia Research Centre. Indeed, the tradition of “ordo-liberalism” identified by Jayasuriya as 
underpinning this approach to economic constitutionalism was cited by Kim as an important element in his own 
economic thinking, as outlined in his book, DJnomics. 
Wayne Errington: Kim-Dae Jung and the Consolidation of Democracy in South Korea 
Page 19 
economy in parallel. Restricting the influence of the few leaves policy-making open to the 
many, an important step in Korea’s process of democratisation. More problematic is the lack 
of transparency in achieving these goals.  
 
Institutional Reform 
Kim’s institutional reform program would certainly have been a force for great change in 
Korea’s political culture were it implemented. Among his broad goals were: an increase in 
participatory democracy, greater co-operation between labour and capital, and increased 
social justice. This had been Kim’s political platform for decades. His coalition with the ULD 
also forced the possibility of a shift to a parliamentary system to be added to his platform. 
Spoiling the mood of national consensus that Kim had worked to produce were the Assembly 
elections looming in early 2000. In September 1998, enough opposition members defected to 
Kim’s new party to give the governing coalition a majority in the Assembly. The opposition 
never forgave Kim for poaching its members. Poaching members from other parties 
perpetuates the instability of the system and re-enforces public cynicism about electoral 
politics.  
 
Kim identified the personalisation of Korean politics as a major problem. Political parties 
remained associated primarily with a single leader rather than a political platform. With the 
president elected by a plurality usually well below forty per cent, there is always a post-
election scramble for a presidential majority in the parliament. Kim himself sought defections 
from the opposition to ensure his party a majority in the national assembly. Personalisation 
also leads to regionalism. All Korean political leaders have strong ties to their home region. 
Kim’s home province, like its hero, was particularly affected by Park’s dictatorship. The 
Kwangju uprising of 1980 led to a bloodbath as the military re-established its political 
dominance. Kim was sentenced to death for leading the uprising. The provinces around 
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Kwangju in Korea’s southwest felt they had been left under-developed by previous regimes.24 
Kim received over ninety per cent of the votes in his home province in 1997. Park, who 
promoted bureaucratic, military and business leaders from his home province, Youngnam, 
sharpened the division of Korean politics by region. In turn, this regionalism tempered 
political mobilisation by class or ideology. The crisis was an opportunity to divorce politics 
from region. Surely a debate on national economic issues would turn on material interests 
rather than region. Kim, however, appointed Cholla natives to eleven of the seventeen cabinet 
posts, and to the top two police posts, leading to opposition claims of regional favouritism.   
 
Kim’s stated agenda was to implement participatory democracy and social justice. Ironically, 
in order to fulfil his goal of consolidating democracy in South Korea, the new president was 
from very early in his term flirting with the authoritarianism of the past. Bills were rammed 
through parliament and strikes broken up by police. Kim was regularly referred to as a 
dictator by his opponents. The new president found himself torn between idealism and 
political expediency. It is clear, though, that the President himself managed, in his own mind, 
to resolve the conflict between these positions. Politicians seeking democratisation (and there 
haven’t been many) tend to think of themselves as different from the kind of tyrannical 
abusers of power that they replace. Kim was no Park. Executive power, he believed, would be 
safe in his hands.  
 
The incoming government planned to reduce the size of the National Assembly, introduce a 
more proportional voting system and possibly also switch from a presidential to a 
parliamentary system in a bid to encourage a more stable party system. The new electoral 
system was aimed at reducing regional polarisation. The GNP opposed these moves, arguing 
that it was a self-serving attempt to entrench the ruling party in power. Revised election laws 
in 1998 allowed trade unions to form political parties and make political donations. Using the 
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majority in the assembly that Kim had manufactured for himself at the end of 1998, a range of 
liberal legislation was passed. Kim also appointed a chief justice with a record of 
independence and integrity. A system of independent counsel to investigate charges against 
ministers was also established. Kim encouraged media scrutiny of his government. NGOs 
were publicly encouraged by the new President, who also addressed a conference of 
international civil society organisations held in Seoul. Some of the more far-reaching changes, 
though, were left on the back-burner. 
 
Having fought for so many years to capture the Presidency, Kim never warmed to the idea of 
a switch to a parliamentary system. Diamond and Shin suggest that a parliamentary system 
would assist democratic consolidation by making legislative impasses less likely.25 Despite 
the common belief that the prime ministers lacked any significant authority under successive 
presidential systems of government, the constitution of the Republic of Korea is quite 
different from the US model. The strong Presidency is a matter of political culture, not just 
constitutional authority. The Korean system could evolve into a French-style semi-
presidential system without any change to the constitution. The circumstance has not yet 
arisen because of manufactured majorities in the Assembly, achieved through defections of 
parliamentarians after presidential elections.26 Any such shift in Korea would surely involve 
semi-presidentialism (increasing the power of the prime minister) rather than pure 
parliamentarism. A complete change of institutional design is very rare and opportunities for 
such sweeping change tend only to follow the complete breakdown of an existing regime. The 
economic crisis may have presented such an opportunity but Kim’s disinclination to proceed 
with this reform was quickly made known. Since the resignation of Kim Jong Pil as Prime 
Minister, the issue has had much less salience for the government. Kim would  instead have to 
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work within, or find a way of bypassing the existing institutions, such as the National 
Assembly, where he confronted opposition at every turn.  
 
Almost a third of Koreans still believed that authoritarianism might sometimes be preferable 
to democracy, a higher proportion than almost all other new democracies.27 Koreans 
overwhelmingly favour economic development over democratisation when asked to choose, 
although much less so among the young. An important element of Kim’s crisis leadership was 
his prioritisation of his democratisation agenda according to his self-image as President. Kim 
clearly revels in his status as Confucian elder statesman. With all the hubris of the political 
leader, Kim believed that measures such as anti-corruption legislation could be delayed as 
corruption would be less of a problem with him in office.28 This approach irritated the NGOs 
which had looked forward to his presidency. After the crisis receded, the opposition was able 
to block this area of reform. Kim’s imperial style scarcely contributed to the consolidation of 
substantive democracy. The sense of the immaturity of Korean democracy was not helped by 
the crisis atmosphere and the high stakes of economic reform. In by-passing the National 
Assembly, Kim contributed to an atmosphere of mistrust in that body, with which he would 
struggle once the crisis atmosphere receded.  
 
Kim’s inability to build a stable party apparatus around him risked the dissolution of the MDP 
upon his departure from office in 2003. Having failed to build a constructive relationship with 
the opposition, the President lacked either the numbers or the authority to get his bills through 
the National Assembly. Kim’s methods in dealing with this problem were less than edifying, 
with accusations from the opposition of such standover tactics as tax audits and threatening 
the employment of family members. Kim’s popularity receded from its initial high levels, 
giving the opposition more courage to defy him. Kim even publicly apologised for the way he 
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had been running the country and promised to change his approach.29 The year ended in this 
malaise despite the twin triumphs of his Nobel Peace Prize Award and emotional re-unions 
between family members separated by the conflict with the North. Indeed, his trip to Norway 
to receive the Peace Prize sparked criticism of his frequent overseas trips in spite of persistent 
domestic problems. Kim was suffering the fate of many leaders who attempt to paint on a 
broad political canvas. He was beginning to be seen to neglect many of the mundane issues 
that affect quality of life – management of the health system, education and employment.  
 
On assuming power, Kim found the majority of Korean political institutions hostile to him. 
His early approach to dealing with this situation was to utilise crisis leadership to build public 
support for his goals, and create an extra-legal tripartite body to negotiate a national 
consensus. Despite a seemingly ambitious program of institutional reform, Kim’s 
achievements in this area were modest. He chose to capture political institutions such as the 
National Assembly and the judiciary rather than reform them. His means of doing so, 
primarily by building his own patronage network to replace that of the previous ruling party, 
went against his instinct that Korean politics needed to be less personalised. The opposition 
accused him of building an “imperial presidency.”30 Nevertheless, his achievements should be 
measured against what had been thought possible after the failures of Kim Young Sam. The 
crisis gave Kim and his followers an opportunity to forge a genuine multi-party democracy. 
By allowing workers and trade unions greater freedom to participate in politics, the nexus 
between the Korean government and the chaebol had been weakened.  
 
Sunshine Policy and National Security 
The importance of relations with the North cannot be underestimated as an obstacle to the 
consolidation of democracy in Korea. As President, Kim attempted to straddle two competing 
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discourses on democracy in South Korea. The first is that national security necessarily 
restricts the amount of political freedom Koreans can enjoy. Democracy is protected by 
securing the sovereignty of the South Korean people against the threat from the North. The 
second discourse surrounds political participation. It is critical of the depth of democracy in 
Korea. This second discourse is in part a direct criticism of the former argument about 
democracy and national security. But it is also inspired by a wider social-democratic vision of 
participatory democracy. The political base of this second discourse had been weakened by 
the repressive military regime, and even after the transition to democracy in 1987, laws 
restricting radical political organisations allowed conservatives to dominate Korean politics.  
 
Kim has historically been the highest profile proponent of the progressive discourse on 
democracy in Korea. His early runs for the presidency attacked the Park regime from the left, 
arguing for greater rights for workers and for a more open relationship with the North. The 
regime labelled him a communist and went to great lengths to expunge him from Korean 
politics, kidnapping him and twice scheduling him for execution. Realpolitik has ensured that, 
as President, Kim had to address the national security concerns held by many Koreans. While 
Kim had amended his approach to re-unification over the years in line with developments in 
the cold war, he was steadfast in his belief of the importance of engagement.31 In order to 
reconcile these competing visions of democracy, Kim linked his program of democratisation 
to reconciliation with the North.  
 
Reconciliation with North Korea, apart from holding the possibility of a transition to 
democracy in North Korea (or its absorption into the Republic of Korea) promises a number 
of political benefits for the South. Limits on freedom of speech and assembly have been 
justified historically by the need to retain a strong, united polity. Reforms to these laws since 
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1987 fell short of allowing unfettered freedom of speech, particularly in matters of national 
security. Security concerns explain, at least in part, why Koreans share with the Taiwanese a 
lower commitment to democracy than citizens in other newly democratised states.32 
Amendments to the National Security Law were blocked in the National Assembly by the 
opposition. Reforming this law has become a major pre-occupation of many NGOs and 
religious groups. The opposition’s veto of Kim’s amendments to the National Security Law 
were predictable. However, Kim did not give this matter the priority his supporters in the 
NGO movement had expected. Kim needed to deal with the perception among conservative 
Koreans that he might compromise the nation’s security. Kim found himself the subject of 
bitter criticism from civil liberties groups for his exercise of executive power. Even his 
release of political prisoners (alleged North Korean spies) met with mixed reviews because of 
the failure to observe the rule of law. This underlines the importance of resolving the stand-
off with North Korea before consensus can be found on civil liberties.  
 
Kim’s longer-term goal of solving the tension between national security and democracy was 
the “Sunshine Policy”, a program of comprehensive engagement with North Korea. This 
approach was heavily criticised by opposition leaders but the Korean public was more 
optimistic. Kim made a historic visit to Pyongyang in 2000 and the two states initiated a 
series of cross-border family reunions. Substantive progress, though, proved to be slow, 
captive as it is to the vagaries of internal North Korean political machinations. Indeed, the 
exchanges in late 2000 turned out to be the high watermark of the Sunshine policy. This lack 
of progress has undermined public support for the policy, many people believing that all of 
the concessions are being made by the South.  
 
Despite the belligerent attitude of the North throughout 2002, inter-Korean relations proved to 
be an important distinction between the candidates in the presidential election, with the ruling 
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party’s determination to resist the more hawkish approach of the US an important factor in 
Roh’s victory. Kim’s attempt to reconcile with the North was his boldest attempt at 
consolidating democracy in Korea. His recognition of the need to take seriously the security 
concerns of conservative Koreans cost him some support among civil liberties groups. This 
problem was never going to be resolved within the term of Kim’s presidency. Further, 
substantial progress in this area requires a willing partner in the North, something that is 
beyond the control of the leader of the Republic of Korea. Nevertheless, the fact that Kim was 
able to retain the trust of the conservative Korean polity while he negotiated with his North 
Korean counterpart was an important step. However, a scandal surrounding Kim’s use of the 
Korea Development Bank to channel funds to North Korea to help facilitate the summit 
tarnished his policy.33 The 2002 presidential election featured a robust debate about South 
Korea’s approach to its neighbour, allowing the social democratic discourse greater space in 
national politics. The North seemed a less threatening place, undermining conservative 
arguments about the need to restrict civil liberties in the interests of national security. 
Relations with the North indicate the complexity of democratic consolidation. This was, 
nevertheless, an important leadership task, involving a relationship of trust with the public.  
 
 
Interpreting Democratic Consolidation in Korea After the Crash 
Kim Dae Jung’s presidency can be favourably compared to the frustration of Kim Young 
Sam. Before the crisis, the weaknesses in Korea's democratic institutions gave the chaebol a 
disproportionate amount of political power. In challenging the entrenched power of the 
chaebol head-on, Kim met massive opposition to his reforms. Bypassing legislative 
obstruction of reforms through executive orders and quasi-official institutions, however, is not 
the same as, and indeed may be the opposite of, democratisation. While opposition claims that 
parliamentary democracy was being dismantled in the bid to tame the opposition were 
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perhaps overstated, neither were many of Kim’s actions consistent with his democratising 
goals. Western commentators who have lauded Kim's political and economic reform nexus 
have a tendency to overlook the possible conflicts between the twin goals. Indeed, a common 
complaint from democratic circles within Korea was of an interventionist and executive-
dominated program of reform.  
 
The tension between Kim's goals also reminds us of the inherent contradiction of a leader 
taking executive action to further democratisation. Thus, Kim’s release of political prisoners 
(alleged North Korean spies) met with mixed reviews from civic groups critical of his use of 
executive power and failure to reform the National Security Law.34 The two Kims both long 
practiced a kind of delegative democracy, keeping the party system weak, and ensuring the 
subordinate status of National Assembly. While this style of leadership may have been 
successful in helping to secure a transition to democracy against an uncompromising regime, 
this style of politics is inimical to consolidation because of its combative nature.  
 
The “reform authoritarianism”35 of the two Kims no longer meets the expectations of younger 
Koreans. Kim Young Sam hoped to limit the opportunity of dissenters to mobilise opposition 
by limiting consultation on his policies. Similarly, Kim Dae Jung wished to rush his reforms 
through while his electoral mandate and the crisis atmosphere gave him the edge over the 
opposition-dominated assembly. Kim’s readiness to blame the crisis on the previous 
government provoked enmity among the opposition, making it more difficult to deal with the 
National Assembly as the crisis atmosphere receded.  
 
Conclusion 
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Kim Dae Jung’s stated agenda for the consolidation of democracy in Korea was multifaceted. 
It involved extensive policy reform in economic, institutional and diplomatic realms. To the 
extent that his democratisation agenda was flawed, it was in Kim’s unwillingness to break 
with Korea’s historic political culture to a more democratic style of leadership. Even in the 
hands of a life-long proponent of democracy the dilemma outlined in the introduction, the 
contradiction between effective leadership and democracy, puts limits on the extent of the 
influence that leaders can have on regime change. Kim recognised that personalised politics 
was an obstacle for the consolidation of democracy. However, in struggling to achieve his 
goals and meet the aspirations of his followers, Kim needed to secure his own power base and 
weaken his opposition. His ability to push through far-reaching economic reforms and make 
North Korea seem less threatening to South Koreans (and their civil liberties) were, indeed, 
significant accomplishments. The extra-parliamentary means used to achieve this goal, was, 
however, more problematic. The weaknesses of Kim’s presidency stemmed from this same 
leadership style.  
 
Political leadership can play a vital role in the consolidation of democracy. Not leadership 
alone (the previous president had attempted and failed to implement many similar policies), 
but leadership in concert with other variables, most notably in this case the economic crisis. 
Kim used the crisis to crystallise many Korean’s latent dislike of the structure of their national 
economy. His long-term relationship with trade unions put him in a unique position of trust to 
steer the restructuring of the economy, which in turn has permanently altered the balance of 
power in national politics away from the chaebol and their political clients. At the same time, 
Kim used his position of trust and the national thirst for reform to further the cause of 
reconciliation with North Korea, which in turn will allow further reform of the National 
Security laws so inimical to democratic freedoms.  
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Kim’s leadership style was so similar to previous presidents that he increasingly came to be 
seen by pro-democracy activists as part of the problem. This is a healthy sign for Korean 
democracy, and perhaps an indicator of evolving public attitudes towards leadership. Kim’s 
presidency may mark, then, not so much a period of great leadership in Korea’s history, but 
an important period in which a leader’s agenda was publicly debated and criticised; in which 
the president’s fallibility did not necessarily detract from public trust in the regime as a 
whole; and in which political parties came to stand for more than the public persona of their 
leaders. These developments may prove to be just as important to the consolidation of 
democracy in Korea than the many positive and negative things Kim did as President. 
Consolidation of democracy involves, in part, an evolution in the attitudes of both political 
leaders and the public about what attributes are desirable in a leader, and how much authority 
a single leader can accrue. 
